The remarkably-European-looking Bashar AssadStill president of Syria as of June 2013
I was reading an essay by somebody named Stephen Zunes.
He argues against (further) U.S. intervention in Syria, despite being anti-Assad.
He writes:
"A large minority of Syrians—consisting of Alawites, Christians, and members of other minority communities; Baath Party loyalists and government employees; the professional armed forces and security services; and the (largely Sunni) crony capitalist class that the government has nurtured—still cling to the Assad regime. There are certainly dissidents within all of these sectors, but altogether regime supporters number as much as one-third of the population."
"This means...that even large-scale direct foreign intervention will not lead to a quick collapse of the regime."
He argues against (further) U.S. intervention in Syria, despite being anti-Assad.
He writes:
"A large minority of Syrians—consisting of Alawites, Christians, and members of other minority communities; Baath Party loyalists and government employees; the professional armed forces and security services; and the (largely Sunni) crony capitalist class that the government has nurtured—still cling to the Assad regime. There are certainly dissidents within all of these sectors, but altogether regime supporters number as much as one-third of the population."
"This means...that even large-scale direct foreign intervention will not lead to a quick collapse of the regime."
Maybe it's best to be wary of armchair estimates of support for Assad. The one-third figure may count active-supporters. The "rebels" (a loose, motley group) may be actively-supported by even fewer. The majority may be ambivalent, just waiting-it-out till the fighting ends.
This discussion reminds me of something I remember from a U.S. history college class. The professor said that in (I think it was) the summer of 1776, as the Declaration of Independence was being signed, colonial-American Whites were divided in opinion, thusly:
A -- One-third supported independence
B -- One-third opposed independence
C -- One-third were either unaware of the independence movement, or were ambivalent about the outcome
[The hard core of group B "walked the walk" and actually fled the newly-created USA when the British abandoned their military effort in the early 1780s. They mostly went to Canada. It's my understanding that these exiles were "the first English-speaking Canadians". Before that wave, English-speakers were few and far between in Canada, though plenty of French-speakers were around. Anglophone Canada is a child of the American Revolutionary War.]
This discussion reminds me of something I remember from a U.S. history college class. The professor said that in (I think it was) the summer of 1776, as the Declaration of Independence was being signed, colonial-American Whites were divided in opinion, thusly:
A -- One-third supported independence
B -- One-third opposed independence
C -- One-third were either unaware of the independence movement, or were ambivalent about the outcome
[The hard core of group B "walked the walk" and actually fled the newly-created USA when the British abandoned their military effort in the early 1780s. They mostly went to Canada. It's my understanding that these exiles were "the first English-speaking Canadians". Before that wave, English-speakers were few and far between in Canada, though plenty of French-speakers were around. Anglophone Canada is a child of the American Revolutionary War.]
There's a big difference between the Colonial-USA of the 1770s and the Syria of the 2010s that occurs to me, though. There were no "sectarian" splits in the 1770s Colonial-USA based on region, religion, or ethnicity. I mean, Group-A (above) could (and did) draw converts from 'B' and 'C', at least passive ones. This seems much less likely in Syria.
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